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I
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
1.

JURISDICTION.

This Court has jurisdiction over ". . .

the final orders and judgments of the district court

"

which jurisdiction futher entitles the court to look at. and
inquire into the facts of the case leading to a final order and
judgment.

If the objective of justice is though the

idenification of the properties of Law, then it is essential
that such properties of Law not be excluded from the case by
restricting this case to only the trial court's final orders and
judgment.

This Court was purposefully set up to ensure that

justice was handed out.

In contract to classical law. in which

one focuses on a single varible at a time and attempts to
"control out" all others, modern law, researches and seeks to
"control in" as many relevant fact0 as possible within the field
of contraversy.

This Court's intent is a court of intermediate

or last resort upon which a party roay claim error and obtain a
reprieve from such error.

Therefore the Court must ascertain

the facts, thinking and discretion leading to the final orders
and judgments, in an effort to determine if a error or abuse of
discretion occured.

See APPEAL & ERROR 940 - 946.

2. NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS.

This appeal is based upon the

Third District Court's dismissal of a collateral attack upon the
"Good Faith" of the antecedent Idaho Decree of Divorce. This
dismissal occured prior to Discovery. Trial of Merits, and
-1-

before the Findings of Facts, and Conclusion of Law.

The court

reversed its previous ruling voiding the antecepent Idaho Decree
of Divorce, February 4, 1988, with no new facts and upon the
presenting of, the "Good Faith Arguement" demands acceptance of
the document without making it a judgment of the Utah Court.
And the Court could not question any part thereof.
II
STATEMENT OF ISSUES FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether the Trial Court abused its discretion in the

dismissal of the collateral attack of the antecepent Idaho
Decree of Divorce, without making the document a judgment in the
Utah courts, reversing the Court's prior decision of February 4,
1988 that the document was void, lacking jurisdiction over the
"res", due to the statements made on the document contradicting
the jurisdictional fact of required residence in the Idaho state.
2.

Such questionable facts as the Trial Court's reversal

of its decision without any new evidence, without a Trial by
Merits, and with other questionable issues arising after the
appearance of the defendant, such as:
a)

The dismissal of a collateral attack on a document,

solely on blind faith of the document without a trial by merits,
futher dening discovery into the alledged fraudulent document.
b)

Unresolution of the issue of Res Inter Alios Acta

(Public actions done by a stranger on someone elses case).
c)

Unresolution of the issue of allegded "conflict of

interest" being that adverse counsel currently represents the
plaintiff, as a minor child, in his parents divorce and now
adverse counsel representing defendant.
d)

Unresolution of the issue of counsel, commiting

multi-counts of deceit on the court.
e)

Granting of sanctions pursuant to defendant's motion

(March 29, 1988), prior to service, in a hearing for a motion
legally before the court on April 1, 1988. With suggestions of
said sanctions being a punishment for being poor and appearing
pro se.
f)

Unresolution of four motions for sanctions for

plaintiff against the defendant.
Ill
STATUTES, AND CASE LAW
1.

IDAHO CODE OF LAW, TITLE 32 (Domestic Relations),

CHAPTER 7 (Divorce Actions), SECTION 32-701 (Residence required
by plaintiff):
"32-701. Residence required by plaintiff. - A divorce
must not be granted unless the plaintiff has been a
resident of the state a full six (6) weeks next
preceding the commencement of the action."
2.

IDAHO ACCEPTED CASE LAW:
"It is essential before a person can lawfully file a
complaint for divorce that he shall have been actually
a bona fide resident for six weeks preceding the
commencement of the action. " HAMPSHIRE v. HAMPSHIRE,
70 Idaho 522, 223 P.2d 950 (1950)

3.

UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT:
•'The full faith and credit clause does not make a
sister-state judgment a judgment in another state, but
to give it that effect, it must be made a judgment
there, which can be done only if the court purpoting
to render the orginal judgment had power to pass on
the merits. (Jurisdictional fact)M WILLIAMS v. NORTH
CAROLINA 325 US 226.

4.

THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT:
"The full faith and credit clause operates only with
respect to judgments rendered by a court whose
jurisdiction, either as to the subject matter or
person, is not impeached." JUDGMENT SECTION 360 - of
sisiter states - full faith and credit.

5.

THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT:
"The domicil (is) necessary to support jurisdiction to
grant divorce, so as to entitle the decree to full
faith and credit." DIVORCE SECTION 4 - jurisdiction
to grant - domicil of one spouse as basis.

6.

THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT:
"A judgment refusing to accord full faith and credit
to the divorce decree of a sister state on the grounds
that no bona fide domicil was acquired there will not
be upset by the United States Supreme Court if this
court finds proper weight was given (sic) to the other
courts' findings." JUDGMENT 370 - divorce - refusal to
accord full faith and credit.

7.

THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT:
"The full faith and credit clause of the Federal
Constitution required the extraterritorial recognition
of the validity of a divorce decree OBTAINED IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS of procedural due
process in a state by a spouse who UNDER THE LAWS OF
SUCH STATE had acquired a bona fide domicil there."
JUDGMENT 370 - full faith and credit of divorce decree
rendered in sister state.

8.

THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT:
"Th recital in proceedings for divorce, of the facts

necessary to give jurisdiction, may be contradicted in
a suit between the same parties in another state.11
BELL v. BELL 181 US 176.
9.

THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT:
"It is too late now to deny the RIGHT collaterally to
impeach a decree of divorce made in another State, by
proof that the court had no jurisdiction, even when
the record purports to show jurisdiction." WILLIAMS
v. NORTH CAROLINA 325 US 228

10.

THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT:
"The apperance of the nonresident defendant cannot
invest a court with jurisdiction of a suit for divorce
instituted by a person who has no bona fide domicili
within the state." ANDREW v. ANDREW 188 US 16

11.

THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT:
"Recital of the decrees entered in divorce cases in
one State are not binding on the court of another
State." DAVIS v. DAVIS 305 US 34

12.

THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT:
"The bona fides of the residence of a party who
obtains a divorce in one State may be inquired into by
the courts of another State." STREITWOLF v. STREITWOLF
181 US 179
IV
RELEVANT FACTS

1.

Plaintiff was and has been for 26 years prior been a

citizen of the state of Utah. (Affidavit of Ronald Troy
Wiedbusch, April 4, 1988)
2.

The parties seperated on or about September 1, 1986.

(Taken pg 7, Relevant Facts, Respondant's Brief, October 5,
1988.)
3.

The antecepent Idaho divorce action was filed

September 29, 1986, twenty eight days after leaving Utah. (Taken
and date corrected from pg 7, Relevant Facts, Respondant's
Brief, October 5, 1988.)
4.

Defendant legally could not file a action for divorce

in the sister-state of Idaho. (Statute and Case Law # 2, this
document.)
5.

The sister state of Idaho could not grant a valid

decree of divorce. (Statute and Case Law # 3, this document.)
V
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1)

Even in the most favorable vison of the circumstances,

not allegations, but facts.

Facts taken straight from the

defendant's own brief, (Case Law and Statute and Case Law # 1-9,
was presented to the Trial Court) the Trial Court's reversal of
its prior decision, that the antecepent Idaho decree was void is
not the view, a reasonable informed person would have taken.
Futher in the Memorandum Decision the Court mentioned, WILLIAMS
v. NORTH CAROLINA 325 US 225 by name, but it is very appearant
the Court did not fully read this Supreme Court decision.

For

it states, the Idaho Decree must be proven before granting of
good faith.

The Court futher stated that domicil implies a

nexus of such signifance as to create legal relations. By
refusing to allow the collateral attack against the Idaho Decree
for lack of domicil, the Trial Court in essence overruled
the US Supreme Court ( Statute and Case Law # 7). In that the

domicil must be acquired in accordance with Idaho law, the Trial
Court stated in essence, the act of filing in the sister-state
of Idaho, was of such signifance as to legally create a domicil.
The Court totally ignored that certain guidelines must be meet,
to regulate such matters, to wit, a period of residence.

This is

the very question presented to the United States Supreme Court in
the Court's cited case.

In which, the Supreme Court upheld that

even if, the party goes to a sister-state, fulfills the required
period of residence, to acquire a bona fide domicil, the decree
will be impeached, for lack of domicil, if the party went for
the purpose of obtaining a divorce.

The Defendant in this case

can not even claim that she even tried to acquire a bona fide
domicil.

And without even a domicil, no reasonable person would

taken the Trial Court's view.

Especially when the Supreme Court

ruled that the mere act of fleaing to a sister-state to get
divorce voids the domicil.

The Trial Court upheld a decree with

no domicil, and a person who filed within days of leaving Utah
solely for the purpose to acquire a divorce, and defraud the
State of Utah and the plaintiff of their respective rights.
2)

That the position of dismissal of the collateral

attack on the antecepent Idaho Decree of Divorce before
Discovery, a Trial by merits. Findings of Facts, and Conclusion
of Law, is unreasonable even in the most favorable light, when
the document is alledged to been acquired by fraud, and contained
fraud as to the real legal relationship of the parties as to

minor children.
3.

The position of unresolution of the issue of Res Inter

Alios Acta, in the circumstances, of the finding of the court,
that the defendant disappeared upon service, the Ordering of
service by letter, and the surprise appearance eleven (11) days
prior to the Default Hearing, is not a reasonable position, in
light of such diversity of facts and questions.

Such as why

wasn't default entered against the Defendant. (Service January
11, 1988, Appearance March 7, 1988 Default Hearing March 18,
1988).

Futher the adverse Counsel's lack knowledge of the

defendant, her financial circumstance, the Order that she
disappeared, her default, and his futher failure to cooperate in
discovery.
4.

That the position of the unresolution of the known

conflict of interest between adverse counsel and his client, is
futher unreasonable.

The Court has a undisputed affidavit of

Diana Kay Buie, March 9, 1988 attesting to this fact, futher
ascertaining that adverse counsel has access to psychological
reports, homestudies, and other sentitive information acquired
on the plaintiff as a minor child. The adverse counsel unoffical
denial of such, without affidavit or other offical evidence, is
not grounds upon which a reasonable personae would leave
unresolved.
5.

The position of not resolving, if facts, that were

presented are true, or false, is not a position to which one

would make a decision upon.

That such an issue should and

would be of paramount importance, before a informed and fair
decision could in fact be handed down.

The question must be

asked what prompts a Court to make a final and absolute decision
without knowing what is truth and what is fiction.
5.

The position of granting sanctions pursuant to the

adverse counsel's motion, (March 29, 1988) against the plaintiff
before the legal service of said motion upon him, futher to hear
it without being set for hearing, and then to grant sanctions
accordingly (April 1, 1988) is not reasonable.
6.

The position of leaving the unresolution of the four

complaints of violation of Rule 11, without hearing, without
objections, without good cause otherwise is not reasonable, and
is not the actions of a person who wasn't under unnatural
pressure.
VI
ARGUMENTS
1)

The facts presented by the defendant in her

Respondant's brief, show that the antecepent Idaho Decree of
Divorce was void, as to jursidiction over the Res. That the view
the Trial court pursued is not one which a reasonable person
would have adopted.

That such oversees any presumption that

this Court must attribute to the Trial Court as the defendant
claims in her brief.
This is uphold by the following Case Law:

Dawson v. Weems, 352 So.2d 1200, Fla.App. (1977); Lemons v. St.
John's Hospital of Salina, 613 P.2d 957, 5 Kan.App.2d 161
(1980); Sapp v. Wong, 609 P.2d 137, 62 Haw. 34 (1980); Turney v.
Ford Motor Co., 50 111.Dec. 85, 418 N.E.2d 1079, 94 Ill.App.3d
678 (1981); David B. v. DeVito, 41 111.Dec. 853, 408 N.E.2d 275,
86 Ill.App.3d 787 (1980); Pisciotta v. Allstate Ins. Co., 385
So.2d 1176 (1979); Hartung v. Hartung, 306 N.W.2d 16, 102 Wis.2d
58 (1981); Maler Const, v. Ryan, 260 N.W.2d 700, 81 Wis.2d 463
(1978).
That this Court has the right to review the facts leading to the
final judgment, and must revise the trial court's decision if it
is plain the court is beyond reason and its action is capricious
and arbitrary.

Livengood v. Sechier, 382 So.2d 567 Ala.Civ.App. (1980); Baumier
v. Baumier, 368 So.2d 864. Ala.Civ.App. (1976); Correa v.
Curbey. 605 P.2d 458, 124 Ariz.App. 480 (1979); Midwest Lime Co.
v. Independence County Chancery Court, 551 S.W.2d 537. 261 Ark.
695 (1977); Volpicelli v. Jared Sydney Torrance Memorial
Hospital, 167 Cal.Rptr. 610, 109 C.A.3d 242 Cal.App. (1980);
Sandstrom v. Larsen, 583 P.2d 971, 59 Haw. 491. 1 A.L.R.4th 1009
(1978); Hawaiian Ocean View Estate v. Pacific Laudry Co., 564
P.2d 436, 58 Haw. 63 (1977); In re Marriage of Preston, 37
111.Dec 442, 402 N.E.2d 332, Ill.App.3d 789 (1978); Mergenthaler
Linotype Co. v. Leonard Storch Enterprises, 23 I11.Dec. 352, 383
N.E.2d 1379, 66 Ill.App.3d 789 (1978); City of Elkhart v.
Middleton. 356 N.E.2d 207, 265 Ind. 514 (1976); Whitman v.
Whitman, 405 N.E.2d 608, Ind.App. (1980); In re Marriage of
Miles, 362 N.E.2d 171, 173 Ind.App. 5 (1977); New England Tel. &
Tel. Co. v. Public Utilities Coram. 390 A.2d 8 (1978); Krichmar
v. Krichmar, 397 N.Y.S.2d 775, 42 N.Y.2d 8585. 366 N.E.2d 863
(1977); Durante v. Frishing, 438 N.Y.S.2d 128, 81 A.D.2d 968
(1977); Ellis v. Hoelzel, 394 N.Y.S.2d 91, 57 A.D.2d 968 (1977);
St. Viadimir Uk. Orth. Church v. Preferred Risk Mut. Ins., 362
A.2d 1052, 239 Pa.Super. 492 (1976); Quaker City Yacht Club v.
Williams, 429 A.2d 1204 (1981); Pratt v. Texas Dept. Human
Resource, 614 S.W.2d 490, Tex.App. (1981); Bennett v. Northcutt,
544 S.W.2d 703. Tex.Civ.App. (1976); Peatross v. Board of Com'rs
of Salt Lake, 555 P.2d 281. Utah (1976); Hartung v. Hartung. 306
N.W.2d 16. 102 Wis.2d 58; Conrad v. Conrad, 284 N.W.2d 674, 92
Wis.2d 407 (1979)

The case must show a strong discretion, judical discretion is
abused when judical action is arbitrary, fanciful, or
unreasonable, or where no reasonable man would take the view
adopted by the court.

Ex parte Guerdon Industries, 373 So.2d 322, Ala. (1979);
Williamson-Johns v. Johns, 355 So.2d 706, Ala. (1978); Saunderson
v. Saunderson, 379 So.2d 91, Ala.Civ.App. (1980); Baumier v.
Baumier, 368 So.2d 864, Ala.Civ.App. (1979); Smith v. Smith,
369 So.2d 1235, Ala.Civ.App. (1978); Interlink Cotton Gin v.
Elmer Tallant Ins., 361 So.2d 604, Parsons v. Parsons, 337 So.2d
765, Ala.Civ.App. (1976), Tobeluk v. Lind. 589 P.2d 487, Alaska
(1979); Haskins v. Shelden, 558 P.2d 487 Alaska (1976), In re
Richard E., 579 P.2d 495, 146 Cal.Rptr. 604, 21 C.3d 349 (1978);
Rich v. City of Benicia, 159 Cal.Rptr. 473, 98 C.A.3d 428,
Cal.App. (1979); People v. Mobile Magic Sales, 157 Cal.Rptr.
749, 96 C.A.3d 14, Cal.App. (1979); Adoption of D.S.C., 155
Cal.Rptr. 406, 93 C.A.3d 14, Cal.App. (1979); Whitcombe v. Yolo
County, 141 Cal.Rptr. 189. 73 C.A.3d 698, Cal.App. (1977)

The Court must conceded that such a weight of Case Law, and
the facts of the case, the Trial Court did not have strong
discretion to uphold the denial of Discovery, a Trial of Merits,
Finding of Facts, and Conclusions of Law, and just arbitrarily,
fanciful and with no reason to dismiss the collateral attack on
the antecepent Idaho Decree of Divorce.

This Complaint

complained of fraud, as to domicli, and fraud as to the facts
recited upon the Decree.
Rather, there is strong discretion, that if the defendant
seperated on September 1, 1986, and filed on September 29, 1986,
that she did not acquire a domcilem in the state of Idaho.
Futher, the Decree recites that the legal relationship

of children is none, and contains a provision the defendant is
uncertain if pregnant, and the complaint alledged that there was
in fact a child, and the defendant sought to keep such fact
secret, which very strongly suggest fraud as to possiblity of
children.
The complaint futher alledged that the defendant was a drug
addict, said child is in paramount danger, and is being raised
in a drug envirorment.

No reasonable person, in the light of

such facts, as the strong possible of the defendants lack of
domicilus, voiding the antecepent Idaho Decree of Divorce, for
lack of jurisdiction over the rem. Strong possible fraud as to
the misrepresentation of the parties possible child, the child
being held by a drug addict, and in a drug envirorment, would
just arbitrary, and fancifully dismiss the action prior to
Discovery, Trial of Merits, Findings of Fact, and Conclusion of
Law.

Especially with three strong affidavits in support

thereof, and no contrary evidence.

With four US Supreme Court

rulings stating with ferocity that the plaintiff has the right
to Discovery, a Trial of Merits, notwithstanding the presence of
the antecepent Idaho Decree of Divorce, said cases were mentioned
in the Memorandum Decision.

This dismissal was not based in

discretion, but was arbitrary, fanciful, and unreasonable, and
no reasonable person would have adopted the view adopted by the
trial court, on the day set for the Default Hearing.
The defendant futher argues that the Court must just accept

the antecepent Idaho Decree of Divorce, because it recites the
jurisdictional fact, and at the awardment of the decree, the
defendant had finally attained her Idaho citizenship.
The antecepent Idaho Decree must be accepted without
being made a judgment here, as the trial court did, is contrary
to Statute and Case Law # 3 , a US Supreme Court ruling.
To award the antecepent Idaho Decree of Divorce good
faith prior to determination of of the issue of its jurisdiction
over the rem, as the trial court did, is contrary to Statute and
Case Law # 4 , a US Supreme Court judgment.
The determination of domicilis is a esstantial part in
the determination if said decree is entitled to full faith and
credit, to blindly uphold the domicilem, as the trial court did,
is contrary to Statute and Case Law # 5 , a US Supreme Court
the standard for the nation.
The determination if such a decree is entitled to full
faith and credit will be upheld if the Supreme Court finds proper
consideration was given to each of the determining court's
Finding of Facts, that such determination was not arbitrary, or
fanciful.

That such encompasses a Trial of Merits, to dismiss

the action, as the trial court did, prior to a trial and on the
day set for the Default Hearing, is in violation of Statutes
and Case Law # 6 , a US Supreme Court's judgment.
Each of the above violations were known to the trial court,
and are all stated on the first page, of WILLIAMS v. NORTH

CAROLINA, 325 US 226, which is mentioned by named in the
Memorandum Decision.

To knowingly overrule the US Supreme Court

is not reasonable, and is simple arbitrary and fanciful.
That in the Trial of Merits the Court must determine is the
antecepent Idaho Decree of Divorce was obtained by the Defendant
in accordance with the requirements of procedural due process in
that state, futher the court must determine under the laws of
that state if the defendant had in fact acquired a bona fide
domicil there.

To do otherwise, as the trial court did, is

contrary to Statute and Case Law # 7 , a US Supreme Court
judgment.
The defendant's argument of the plaintiff's being
personally served and entering court papers invested the Idaho
forum with jurisdiction.

Such an argument is not based upon

law, but is arbitrary and fanciful.

This is a direct conflict

with Statute and Case Law # 1 0 , a US Supreme Court ruling.
The defendant's argument that the court can not inquire
into the antecepent Idaho Decree of Divorce, and the defendant's
domicil.

That the plaintiff must seek relief in the foreign

state of Idaho, is also not based upon the law, but is fanciful
thinking.

That such is contrary to Statute and Case Law # 12, a

US Supreme Court ruling.
The defendant's argument that Utah can not collaterally
impeach its sister-states decree is futher not based upon the
law, and is contrary to Statute and Case Law # 9 , a US Supreme

ruling.
The defendant's lastest argument presented in her brief,
that the court must accept the antecepent Idaho Decree of
Divorce because it recites the jurisdictional fact, is capricious
and lacks a base in the law.

It stands contrary to Statute and

Case Law # 8 , a US Supreme Court ruling, that the recital of the
facts necessary to give jurisdiction, may be contradicted in a
suit by the same parties in another state.

It futher is

contrary to Statute and Case Law # 1 1 , a US Supreme Court
ruling, in which the Supreme Court Orders that the recital of
the decrees entered in divorce cases in the sister state of
Idaho are not binding on the courts of Utah.
Recitals of the decrees may be contradicted. And are not
binding upon a court of another state.

Futher a divorce

acquired by a party in one state, the domicil may be questioned.

Bell v. Bell, 181 US 175; Streitwolf v. Streitwolf, 181 US 179;
Andrews v. Andrews, 188 US 14; Haddock v. Haddock, 210 US 502;
Simmons v. Simmons, 57 D.C.App. 216; Cheeley v. Clayton, 110 Us
701; Frey v. Frey, 61 D.C.App. 232.

The fact the record of the divorce decree in Idaho recites
the jurisdictional fact of residence can make no difference.

Hard v. Shipman, 6 Barb. 623; Bolton v. Schriever, 135 UY 73;
Matter of Law, 56 App Div 454; Ferguson v. Crawford, 70 NY 273;
Thompson v. Whitman, 18 Wall 457; Thorman v. Frame, 176 US 350;
Plant v. Harrison, 36 Misc. Rep. 649.

The recitals of facts in a decree may be contradicted as to
the facts neccessary to give the court jurisdiction; and, if it
be shown that such facts did not exist, the record will be a
nullity, notwithstanding it may recite that they did exist.

Bell v. Bell, 181 US 175; Thompson v. Whitman, 18 Wall 457, 21 L
ed 897; Knowles v. Logansports gaslight & Coke Co. 19 Wall 61,
22 L ed 72; Sewall v. Sewall, 122 Mass 156, 23 Am Rep 299;
Shannon v. Shannon, 4 Allen 134; Leith v. Leith, 39 N.H. 20;
Gregory v. Gregory, 78 Me 187, 57 Am Rep 299; Cross v. Cross,
108 NY 628, 15 NE 333; Kerr v. Kerr, 41 NY 272; People v.
Dawell, 25 Mich 247, 22 Am Rep 260; Reed v. Reed, 52 Mich 121,
50 Am Rep 247, 17 NW 720; Chaney v. Byran, 15 Lea 589.

To argue that the recital of the jurisdictional fact was
upon the antecepent Idaho Decree of Divorce warrents it to blind
acceptance is utterly not based in acceptable law.
VII
CONCLUSION
The decision of this Court will set forth the grounds for
the collateral attack of foreign sister-states decrees against
Utah citizens.

That the Court will now determine if the

citizens are protected from fraudulent illegal actions, or fair
game for every deceitful 1 person in the country.
The Court has been fully advised with the evidence that was
presented to the trial court.

Such evidence which strongly

discerns that dismissal of the plaintiff's action, in such
strong facts even admitted by the defendant, in her brief, was
not the actions of reason.

But was done arbitrary and

fancifully, standing as a huge abuse of discretion.
It was proven that the plaintiff has always resided in this
state, of Utah.

From the defendant's relevant facts, she states

she left the plaintiff on the 1st day of September, 1986. She
went straight way to the foreign sister-state of Idaho. She less
than 29 days later, filed a action for divorce in Idaho.
It has futher been proven that the sister-state of Idaho
has proclaimed that such is a unlawfully filing, in their
courts.

See Statute and Case Law # 2.

And it was shown, the

Idaho people have forbidden the courts of the sister-state of
Idaho to issue a Decree of Divorce unless a person has lived in
Idaho for six (6) weeks before a person files in their courts
for divorce.
Such strong evidence is ample for even this Court to impeach
the sister state of Idaho's antecepent Decree of Divorce.
For the trial court, to know of the US Supreme Court's
rulings, judgments, ferociously forbiding the court to grant
blind faith to the decree, and to go ahead and do such a action,
is beyond law.

For the trial court to overlook the US Supreme

Court's Command to the trial court, to make the Idaho judgment a
judgment in Utah, the trial court's overlooking the US Supreme
Court's Command to the trial court, to make a determination of
the Idaho's courts jurisdiction, the trial court's overlooking
the US Supreme Court's Command to the trial court, that the
trial court must make a determination of domicilis, the US

Supreme Court's saying this determination is essential to
determine if the antecepent Idaho Decree of Divorce is even
entitled to full faith and credit, and last, the trial court
overlooking of the US Supreme Court's command, to the trial
court, that the determination of full faith and credit, must
have the weight of the court's proper consideration, and such a
determination, being of such paramount importance, due to its
infringement of each States' and each parties rights, the US
Supreme Court commanding the trial court that such a
determination MUST NOT be arbitrary, or fanciful, and for the
trial court to just arbitrarily dismiss such a paramount issue,
without discovery, without a trial of merits, without findings
of facts, without conclusions of law, can not be construed to be
anything but unreasonable, and no reasonable person would take
this view, the same view which was adopted by the trial court.
Then to have the trial court to have claimed to have read
WILLIAMS v. NORTH CAROLINA 325 US 226, when on the first page,
page 226, the very page the US Supreme Court reiterates each the
foregoing commands is total and absolute abuse of discretion.
The defendant has taken the stance that the plaintiff is
asking for extra-ordinary relief.

The plaintiff is asking only

for the chance to prove his case.

The chance for discovery to

acquire evidence of such, to show beyond a shadow of doubt, that
his allegations are in fact true.

The chance for a trial of

merit, to present his evidence, to a court of law.

The chance

to obtain a redress from the grievances he complains from.
Such is not extra-ordinary relief.
The plaintiff now comes to this court, complains of two
errors, 1) how could the trial court rule on the Motion for
Sanctions (March 29, 1988) prior to service and grant damages in
favor of the defendant against the plaintiff, 2) the US Supreme
Court, ferocily upholds the plaintiff right to discovery, trial
by merits, and redress, but the trial court abused its
discretion, and arbitrarily dismissed the action.
These are the errors the plaintiff complains of and ask for
reprieve from the trial court's abuse.

The US Supreme Court

commands that such a paramount action as this, each issue must
be given the full weight of the court's determination.

This

surely cannot be done, without discovery, trial by merit, and no
reasonable person would attempt to make a determination prior to
such.

With the weight of evidence strongly suggest, the

truthfullness of the invalidity of the antecepent Idaho Decree
of Divorce.
THEREFORE the plaintiff prays for this Court to uphold his
appeal, and protect this States' and his rights.
DATED this the 25th day of October, 1988.

^Jj&^S^Uv^
R. Troy Stfeker,

Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigns hereby certifies that four copies of the
foregoing document entitled "REPLY BRIEF" was sent to the
adverse counsel, Peter W. Guyon, Attorney for Cindy Lou Baker,
and was personally served at his office of 10 Exchange Place #
614, Salt Lake City, Utah.
DATED this the 25th day of October, 1988.
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R, Troy Staker (Wiedbusch)
Plaintiff
208 South Main # 38
Midvale, Utah 84047
Te1ephone: 562-2568
IN

THE

THIRD

JUDICAL

DISTRICT

COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY

STATE OF UTAH

RONALD TROY WIEDBUSCH (STAKER),
AFFIDAVIT OF RONALD
TROY WIEDBUSCH.

Plaintiff,
vs.
CINDY

LOU

WIEDBUSCH (BAKER),

Civil No. D-37-4844

Defendant.

STATE OF UTAH

Judge Scott Daniels

)
: 55.

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
I,

Ronald

Troy

Wiedbusch, being first duly sworn, do

hereby and upon oath swear and state as follows:
1.
am

I am the Plaintiff in the above named action, and I

fully competent to testify as to all matters hereinafter

set forth:
2.
and/or

I

have

never

in person or any other manner, have

tried to, transact business anywhere in the State of

Idaho;
3.
have

I

have

never

in

person

or

any

other

manner,

and/or tried to, committ a tortius act anywhere in the

State of Idaho}
-1-

4.

I

and/or

have

tried

never

in person or any other manner, have

to, own any real estate anywhere in the State

of Idaho;
5.

I

and/or

have

tried

to,

never

in person, or any other manner, have

insure anything anywhere in the State of

Idaho;
6.

I

and/or

have

tried

to

never

in person, or any other manner, have

maintain

a

"Domicile",

of

any sort,

anywhere in the State of Idaho;
7.

I

have

committed

never

in person or any other manner, ever

any acts of any sort, to give rise to a cause for

divorce, anywhere in the State of Idaho;
3.

I

lived,

have

resided,

never

in person or any other manner, ever

and/or

stayed,

at any time or in any way

anywhere in the State of Idaho, for even one day;
9- I have never in any way, intentionally, consented to
the jurisdiction of The District Court, of the Third Judical
District,

State

of

Idaho,

In

and

for

the

County

of

Washington;
10.
Title

I

5-514

have never
of

Idaho

committed any action as outlined, in
Law,

entitled

Acts

non-resident to jurisdiction of Idaho Courts.

-2-

submitting

a

11.

That

proceeding
against

if
the

said

jurisdiction
granting

no

act

was

action,
action

can

be

jurisdiction

done

that

does

to

grant

jurisdiction

the act of defending oneself

not constitue an act upon which

seized, this Right to defend, without
or

submission, is granted under the

9th Admendment of the Constitution of the Untied States.
DATED this the 4th Day of April, 1988.

R. Troy Wiepbusch (Staker)
Plaintif-KO
STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
SUBSCRIBED

AND

SWORN to before me this the 4th day of

April, 1988.

NOTARY PUBLIC Residing a^t
Salt Lake County.
_J
My Commission Expires:

